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This Article focuses on the Situational Crime Prevention (SCP)
approach in criminology, which expands the crime reduction role well
beyond the justice system. SCP sees criminal law in a more restrictive
sense, as only part of the anticrime effort in governance. We examine the
“general” and “specific” responses to crime problems in the SCP
approach. Our review demonstrates that the most serious barrier to
converting SCP techniques into policy remains the gap that exists between
problem identification and problem response. We discuss past large-scale
SCP interventions and explore the complex links between them and SCP’s
better known specificity and piecemeal approach. We develop a graded
framework for selecting responses that acknowledge the local, political,
and organizational issues involved in identifying and choosing them. This
framework determines when SCP interventions and policies can be crafted
on the macro level to eliminate or greatly reduce the problem everywhere,
and when interventions should be limited to a piecemeal, local approach to
eliminate only the specific problem. Finally, we situate this analysis within
the general context of the relationship between science and policy, noting
the challenges in converting scientific observations into broad social policy
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and the expansion of crime control beyond criminal justice into the realm of
government regulation and partnerships with nongovernmental agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
The criminal justice system normally focuses on two extremes of
public action—large-scale legislation of what is considered a crime, and
individual arrests and prosecutions. Situational Crime Prevention (SCP), a
leading action-oriented approach in criminology, emphasizes an approach
between these two extremes.1 It focuses on particular crime problems,
which may include noncriminal problems,2 usually on a local level, that
generate several different individual criminal cases. Thus, a “problem”
drinking establishment may generate a number of alcohol-related offenses
in its vicinity. Like its sister field problem-oriented policing, SCP’s
approach begins by defining a problem as beyond any single criminal act or
any particular legal case. Yet a problem is also smaller than the overall
disorganization or injustice in a community, society, or the criminal law
process itself.

1
For an overview of the SCP approach, see Ronald V. Clarke, Seven Misconceptions of
Situational Crime Prevention, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME PREVENTION AND COMMUNITY
SAFETY 39 (Nick Tilley ed., 2005).
2
In addition to reducing crime, SCP has also long been used to prevent or reduce legal
noncriminal problems that are said to harm individuals or society.
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SCP calls for minutely analyzing this specific crime type (or problem)
to uncover what situational factors facilitate a crime’s commission.
Intervention techniques are then devised to manipulate the situational
factors. In theory, this approach reduces crime by making it impossible for
the crime to be committed or by reducing cues that increase a person’s
motivation to commit a crime during specific types of events.3 SCP is more
likely to employ civil and administrative law to regulate establishments or
individual behavior than to seek to arrest offenders one by one. This
strategy has given rise to a retinue of methods that have been found to
reduce crime at a local and sometimes national or international level.4
SCP’s focus is thus on reducing crime opportunities rather than punishing
or rehabilitating offenders as individuals. In sum, SCP expands the role of
crime reduction well beyond the justice system. It sees criminal law in a
much more restrictive sense, as only part of the anticrime effort in
governance. We come back to this point and expand upon it below.
In this Article, we describe the “general” and “specific” responses to
crimes and harmful noncriminal problems that are typical of the SCP
approach. We demonstrate that there may be inconsistencies, or at least
some ambivalence, regarding when or how the general or specific responses
should be applied. We propose a graded framework for selecting responses
that acknowledge the local, political, and organizational issues involved in
identifying and choosing them. The framework helps determine when
interventions and policies can be crafted on the macro level to eliminate or
greatly reduce the problem everywhere and when interventions should be
limited to a piecemeal, local approach to only eliminate the specific
problem. This framework also can determine if a mixed response is needed,
3
For discussions of soft SCP that seeks to reduce cues that increase an individual’s
motivation to commit a crime during specific situations, see Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V.
Clarke, Opportunities, Precipitators, and Criminal Decisions: A Reply to Wortley’s Critique
of Situational Crime Prevention, in THEORY FOR PRACTICE IN SITUATIONAL CRIME
PREVENTION 41, 45–48 (Martha J. Smith & Derek B. Cornish eds., 16 Crime Prevention
Studies, 2003); Richard Wortley, Situational Precipitators of Crime, in ENVIRONMENTAL
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIME ANALYSIS 48 (Richard Wortley & Lorraine Mazerolle eds., 2008)
[hereinafter Wortley, Situational Precipitators]; Richard Wortley, A Classification of
Techniques for Controlling Situational Precipitators of Crime, 14 SECURITY J. 63 (2001).
4
For discussions on the effectiveness of SCP techniques in reducing crime, see Ronald
V. Clarke, Introduction to SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: SUCCESSFUL CASE STUDIES 1
(Ronald V. Clarke ed., 2d ed. 1997). For a discussion of the common critique against SCP
that interventions to reduce crime will simply displace crime to other areas that did not
receive the intervention, as well as a systematic review of studies that tested this critique and
instead found that most SCP interventions resulted in an overall crime reduction, see Rob T.
Guerette & Kate J. Bowers, Assessing the Extent of Crime Displacement and Diffusion of
Benefits: A Review of Situational Crime Prevention Evaluations, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 1331
(2009).
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since some situationally bound responses require intervention from a distant
source.
In what follows, subparts I(A), (B), and (C) outline different types of
policies. Subpart I(D) reviews one of SCP’s “seminal themes,” the need to
focus on specific crimes (and legal problems) to identify effective
prevention policies.5 In subpart II(A), we discuss SCP’s twenty-five
techniques, and in subpart II(B) we highlight the difficulties in analyzing
specific problems that must be overcome to develop large-scale social
policies. We also outline the importance of resolving this issue. We discuss
past large-scale SCP interventions and explore any contradictions between
them and SCP’s better-known piecemeal, local approach. Subpart II(C) sets
forth our preliminary framework, encompassing three levels of
interventions—piecemeal or local; macro; and mixed—and provides a set
of guidelines indicating when and where interventions should be attempted
on each level. Next, Part III discusses the significant role SCP has played,
and will continue to play, as an action-oriented, policy-driven approach in
criminology. Subpart III(A) focuses on the issue of problem ownership
while subpart III(B) discusses the role of government. Finally, Part IV
places SCP within the current debates concerning the relationship between
science and policy in other areas such as environmental pollution, public
health and climate change. We demonstrate that whether the SCP approach
should be used to prevent or reduce certain types of behaviors related to
these issues or problems is a difficult question. The answer to this question
cannot easily be found in the SCP approach. The decision to use SCP
strategies to reduce or prevent certain behaviors is often value-driven and
based upon politics as opposed to science.6
I. SCP’S SPECIFICITY REQUIREMENT AND EFFECTIVE PREVENTION
POLICIES
A. LEVELS (TYPES) OF CRIME PREVENTION POLICIES

Crime prevention policies could be categorized as supersized,
medium-sized, or little. National governments and multinational
corporations create supersized general policies. Multinational corporate
5
For discussions on the importance of focusing on specific crime types or problems, see
Derek B. Cornish & Martha J. Smith, On Being Crime Specific: Observations on the Career
of R.V.G. Clarke, in THE REASONING CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V.
CLARKE 30 (Nick Tilley & Graham Farrell eds., 2012).
6
This is assuming that science is, or ought to be, value free. For a discussion of
evidence-based research, values, and policy goals, see Todd R. Clear, Policy and Evidence:
The Challenge to the American Society of Criminology: 2009 Presidential Address to the
American Society of Criminology, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2010).
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policies are mostly hidden from the public, except on issues that become a
matter of public concern and may directly affect corporate interests.
National governments, however, are forced to publicly state their positions
or policies. Often, government statements convey an intention to translate
their positions into laws and regulations of various kinds, or express laws
already written.7 These government policies are typically divided into two
substantive kinds: domestic and foreign. Domestic policies state a
government’s position on crime, health, the economy, education,
technology, and so on. Foreign policies focus on strategic relations with
other nations, and include defense, the military, trade, policing of borders,
international crime, international health, relations with international bodies,
and regulation of international zones such as fishing areas.8
Policies of large corporations and nongovernmental organizations may
range from foreign policy (where to locate a new factory) to internal labor
relations (sexual harassment guidelines), depending on the size and location
of the corporation’s operations.
Policies of state governments and medium-sized businesses fall
somewhere between large and small. In the United States, much of the
above is repeated at the state level. Although the right of states to conduct
foreign relations is limited, there is still considerable activity in that area,
especially in enticing foreign investment.

7
For a review of the role of government in creating crime prevention policies and their
implications for multinational corporations with respect to the design of consumer products,
see Ronald V. Clarke & Graeme R. Newman, Modifying Criminogenic Products: What Role
for Government?, in DESIGNING OUT CRIME FROM PRODUCTS AND SYSTEMS 7 (Ronald V.
Clarke & Graeme R. Newman eds., 18 Crime Prevention Studies, 2005). For more recent
work by Clarke and his associates on trafficking in endangered species that addresses the
national and international levels of policy derived from a situational approach, as well as
discussions of SCP strategies that have been successfully applied to reduce poaching and
other crimes against endangered species, see JACQUELINE L. SCHNEIDER, SOLD INTO
EXTINCTION: THE GLOBAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES (2012); Stephen Pires & Ronald
V. Clarke, Are Parrots CRAVED? An Analysis of Parrot Poaching in Mexico, 49 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 122 (2012); Stephen F. Pires & Ronald V. Clarke, Sequential Foraging,
Itinerant Fences and Parrot Poaching in Bolivia, 51 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 314 (2011).
8
It is also worth noting that some national policies are specifically implemented to
reduce crime or other harmful acts. Examples include national policies that address the
design of cars or cell phones. On the other hand, certain government actions simply build the
capacity for local action by providing resources to local entities to respond to the problem or
crime. For example, both the U.S. and British governments have financially supported the
development of Problem Oriented Policing centers that seek to solve problems locally, in
accord with local priorities. However, the problem-solving capacity is established centrally.
See, e.g., Peter Homel, Joining up the Pieces: What Central Agencies Need to Do to Support
Effective Local Crime Prevention, in PUTTING THEORY TO WORK: IMPLEMENTING
SITUATIONAL PREVENTION AND PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 111 (Johannes Knutsson &
Ronald V. Clarke eds., 20 Crime Prevention Studies, 2006).
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Little policies are those of local governments, counties, cities and
towns. While these are confined mostly to domestic issues, some cities have
ranged into the foreign. The New York Police Department, for example, has
developed its own antiterrorism organization with operatives placed
abroad.9 But by and large, it is at this level that policies are translated into
specific ordinances or regulations. For example, the hour at which a builder
may begin his work in the morning in a residential suburb is regulated by
many local ordinances.
B. SCP AND THE LOCAL LEVEL

It is at this little or local level that, when possible, SCP’s responses are
usually directed. Tilley explains why this is so by drawing parallels
between Clarke’s SCP10 and various strains of Popperian thought.11 Both
perspectives reject schemes to solve large and abstract problems (e.g.
“inequality”) through grand social engineering initiatives.12 Popper13 and
Clarke14 reject revolutions and endeavors, such as the Mobilization for
9

See generally MITCHELL D. SILBER, THE AL QAEDA FACTOR (2012) (discussing Al
Qaeda plots against the United States and other Western nations that were foiled and
analyzing the factors that may have played a role in thwarting these planned strikes);
MITCHELL D. SILBER & ARVIN BHATT, CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE DEP’T, RADICALIZATION IN
THE WEST: THE HOMEGROWN THREAT (2007), available at http://www.nypdshield.org/public/
SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-Radicalization_in_the_West.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/R7ZT-A5TG (reviewing generally the New York Police Department’s
counterterrorism efforts).
10
For an overview of Clarke’s SCP claims, see Clarke, supra note 1; P. Mayhew et al.,
Crime as Opportunity, in HOME OFFICE RESEARCH STUDIES (Home Office Research Study
No. 34, 1976); R.V.G. Clarke, “Situational” Crime Prevention: Theory and Practice, 20
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 136 (1980)..
11
See generally Nick Tilley, Karl Popper: A Philosopher for Ronald Clarke’s
Situational Crime Prevention?, in TRADITION AND INNOVATION IN CRIME AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE 39 (Shlomo G. Shoham & Paul Knepper eds., 8 Israel Studies in Criminology, 2004)
(discussing the relationship between Popperian philosophy and SCP).
12
John W. N. Watkins, Social Knowledge and the Public Interest, in MAN AND THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 173, 178–79 (William A. Robson ed., 1972); Paul Knepper, Situational
Logic in Social Science Inquiry: From Economics to Criminology, 20 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON.
25, 35–39 (2007).
13
For an overview of Popper’s arguments in favor of small-scale piecemeal
interventions and a general wariness of large-scale schemes to remake society (due to the
danger of unintended consequences), see KARL POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS
ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF PLATO (1945) [hereinafter POPPER, SPELL OF P LATO]; 2 KARL
POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: THE HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY: HEGEL, MARX,
AND THE AFTERMATH (1945) [hereinafter POPPER, HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY]; KARL R.
POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS (1963).
14
For a discussion of SCP’s rejection of large-scale social engineering initiatives, see
Clarke, supra note 1; Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, in BUILDING A SAFER
SOCIETY: STRATEGIC APPROACHES TO CRIME PREVENTION 136 (Michael Tonry & David P.
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Youth implemented by President Johnson in the 1960s, based on grand
ideas of eradicating juvenile delinquency by eliminating poverty.15 A
corollary is SCP’s distinctive concern with proximal causes of specific
problems in both analysis and practice. This emphasis separates SCP from
other criminological theories that often focus on distal causes of relatively
wide problems. SCP is also based upon a different view of science and of
governance than other criminological frameworks, which usually rely on
the justice system to address crime problems. SCP sees an important role
for crime reduction for many other governmental departments than the legal
system, as well as for quasi-governmental actions by private entities.16
Popper advocated that governments and social scientists tackle small
problems one at a time.17 The central focus of Clarke’s approach has
similarly been to use situational analyses of when, where, and how specific
crimes occur.18 Cornish’s ‘script’ method, which examines the specific
problem or crime in detail, is usually used to identify possible intervention
points.19 As Cornish and Clarke explain, crime “[scripts] . . . involve such
chains of decisions and actions, separable into interdependent stages,
involving the attainment of sub-goals that serve to further the overall goals
of the crime.”20 These analyses identify the opportunities that allow crime
to occur. Analysts are encouraged to review the empirical literature to
identify similar problems and interventions that were used successfully to
eliminate or reduce them.21 If no successful interventions in similar settings
are identified, analysts are trained to apply SCP’s techniques and principles
from related frameworks, like routine activities theory, to generate
innovative solutions.22 Typically, many possible solutions emerge from the
literature or are devised through innovation.
Farrington eds., 19 Crime & Justice, 1995).
15
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, SOC. & REHAB. SERV., A
SITUATIONAL APPROACH TO DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (1970) (calling for large-scale social
change to eradicate juvenile delinquency); Tilley, supra note 11, at 40–41.
16
See Clarke, supra note 10.
17
See POPPER, SPELL OF Plato, supra note 13; POPPER, HIGH TIDE OF PROPHECY, supra
note 13.
18
See Clarke, supra note 10.
19
See generally Derek Cornish, The Procedural Analysis of Offending and Its Relevance
for Situational Prevention, in 3 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 151 (Ronald V. Clarke ed.,
1994) (introducing the script approach to criminology for the first time).
20
Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke, Analyzing Organized Crimes, in RATIONAL
CHOICE AND CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR 41, 47 (Alex R. Piquero & Stephen G. Tibbetts eds.,
2002).
21
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS.,
CRIME ANALYSIS FOR PROBLEM SOLVERS IN 60 SMALL STEPS (2005) (discussing how
particular interventions are identified).
22
For discussions of this point, see John E. Eck, Learning from Experience in Problem-
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In spite of this demonstrated success in crime prevention, SCP has
been criticized by Michael Benson as “leading to piecemeal, finger-in-adike-type responses to general problems”23 because each crime problem is
specific to time, place, and opportunity.
C. SCP AND THE MACRO LEVEL

Yet some effective interventions are large-scale and general, such as
the impact of the removal of carbon monoxide from the public gas supply in
Great Britain on the number of suicides. Clarke and Mayhew exploited that
change to demonstrate the potential power of SCP interventions.24 Taking
into account population change and other extraneous variables, the number
of British suicides fell from about 5,700 people in 1963 to almost 3,700
people in 1975.25 In the early 1960s, gas suicides accounted for over 40% of
suicides each year.26 Clarke and Mayhew explained that when the gas was
available in people’s homes, it was easy to use, deadly, and painless. Other
forms of suicide, however, lacked these benefits and most motivated gas
suicide seekers did not turn to other methods when the easy opportunity—
the poisonous public gas supply—was removed.27 The removal of carbon
monoxide from the public gas supply in Great Britain, in other words, led to
the almost complete elimination of suicide by gas inhalation. On its face,
this evidence refutes Benson’s criticism.28
Oriented Policing and Situational Prevention: The Positive Functions of Weak Evaluations
and the Negative Functions of Strong Ones, in EVALUATION FOR CRIME PREVENTION 93
(Nick Tilley ed., 14 Crime Prevention Studies, 2002); Paul Ekblom, Ideas Brought back
from Situational Crime Prevention’s Exploration of Design Against Crime, in THE
REASONING CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V. CLARKE, supra note 5, at 52,
54–55, 58–60. Eck also argues that the SCP approach is akin to generative theory. He
explains that SCP does “not dictate specific actions, but provide[s] a framework for the
creation of context relevant interventions . . . . These are tools that might work in some
circumstances but probably do not work in every circumstance.” Eck, supra at 105.
23
Michael L. Benson, Offenders or Opportunities: Approaches to Controlling Identity
Theft, 8 CRIMINOLOGY AND PUB. POL’Y 231, 235 (2009).
24
See generally Ronald V. Clarke & Pat Mayhew, The British Gas Suicide Story and Its
Criminological Implications, 10 CRIME & JUST. 79 (1988) (discussing the large-scale
reduction in suicide, with limited displacement, that occurred as a result of Great Britain’s
move away from carbon monoxide in the public gas supply). As our colleague noted, it
could be that large-scale dramatic examples receive more publicity than local, prosaic, caseby-case, piecemeal SCP interventions. This makes the lack of attention given to this
contradiction even more puzzling.
25
See Clarke & Mayhew, supra note 24, at 79.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
This change to natural gas was not designed to reduce suicide. The large-scale
reduction in suicide was a positive unintended byproduct. Interestingly, SCP has benefited
from a number of interventions that were implemented for other reasons, but also reduced
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A public health expert might argue that other methods or types of
suicide should have been addressed in designing responses, which seems to
be the basis of Benson’s finger-in-the-dyke criticism. They were addressed,
but only in respect to displacement of gas suicide to other methods of
suicide. There was no such displacement. There was no attempt to reduce
other types of suicide. Thus, while removing coal gas almost entirely
eliminated gas suicide and reduced the number of suicides overall, it did not
solve the general problem of suicide in society. In other words, suicide was
not eliminated.
D. SCP AND SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS

How, precisely, specific solutions for the particular problem at issue
are decided upon remains a bit of a mystery.29 The process appears similar
to how a doctor diagnoses a range of puzzling symptoms and develops a
treatment plan, which gives rise to the popular view of medicine as an “art”
as well as a science. Clarke also offers us diagnostic tools, the famous
twenty-five techniques of SCP.30 The twenty-five techniques are outlined
below in Table 1. Clarke explains that the techniques “assist systemization
of knowledge about situational prevention and . . . provide practical help to
practitioners.”31 Yet the techniques are not so much diagnostic of the
situations as they are intervention techniques that might be applied after the
situation has been analyzed. These techniques have evolved in response to
critiques that some situations also provoke offenders to act32 and led
Cornish and Clarke to increase the number of techniques from sixteen to
twenty-five.
The techniques help identify appropriate interventions. But if they are
also used to analyze the problem, it raises the danger that one may find only
crime or other harmful problems. Sometimes these interventions are subsequently used
elsewhere to intentionally reduce crime and other problems.
29
For discussions about how specific SCP intervention techniques are identified, see
Paul Ekblom, Designing Products Against Crime, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME PREVENTION AND
COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 203; Michael S. Scott, Shifting and Sharing Police
Responsibility to Address Public Safety Problems, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME PREVENTION AND
COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 385.
30
See Cornish & Clarke, supra note 3, at 90 for the famous twenty-five techniques.
31
Ronald V. Clarke, Affect and the Reasoning Criminal: Past and Future, in AFFECT
AND COGNITION IN CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING 35 (2014).
32
For discussions of Wortley’s important critique, see RICHARD WORTLEY, SITUATIONAL
PRISON CONTROL: CRIME PREVENTION IN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS (2002) [hereinafter
WORTLEY, SITUATIONAL PRISON]; Wortley, Situational Precipitators, supra note 3. For a
discussion of Cornish and Clarke’s subsequent (partial) acceptance of Wortley’s critique—
that motivated offenders do not simply enter into situations that provide opportunities to
offend, but that certain situations can also create or increase offender motivation to offend—
see Cornish & Clarke, supra note 3.
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what one is looking for. This is an old problem of empirical science: the
difficulty in separating theory from observation33 (called the “Oedipus
effect” by some).34 It is similar to the medical-field phenomenon in which
physicians may approach an illness with a finite range of treatment plans.
The diagnosis in many cases is irrelevant to the treatment plan eventually
chosen to alleviate or remove the symptoms. In the latter case, perhaps,
there is agreement between SCP and medical diagnosis: there is no need to
find the “root cause” of the problem if the available treatment plan works.
Often, different treatments are used until one does work. In sum, it is the
intervention plan that matters most in diagnosing a problem and responding
to it. Do the twenty-five techniques do the job?
II. THE TWENTY-FIVE TECHNIQUES: WHAT ARE THEY, REALLY?
A. SCP’S TECHNIQUES AS GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Table 1 reproduces the basic framework of SCP’s twenty-five
techniques. Presented in this way, one can see that they are not techniques
at all. They say what to do, but they do not say how to do it. They do,
however, clearly urge one to do something. The general headings are listed
in Column 1 and are based upon five areas that originate from various
social psychological theories related to rational choice and behavior
modification. Those theories all presume that certain environmental and
psychological factors cause a specific crime. But because these headings
are written in the language of advocacy rather than science,35 they are a
curious mixture of policy and causation. All social policies are written in
such language: they presume particular causes and advocate action.
The five headings might best be construed as a set of guiding
principles, each of which contains a list of measures that might reduce the
probability of a crime event. The principles reflect differing assumptions
about the psychology of offending, but are all intended to lead to responses
that affect the decisionmaking processes of offenders and thereby reduce
offenses. Consider, for example, gun violence. Accepting the SCP scientific
observation that the easy availability of guns is one cause of gun violence

33

See Ekblom, supra note 22, who similarly notes that prevention policies also implicate
verbal issues. One intervention can be explained in a variety of ways. For instance, a
burglary initiative could be portrayed as aiding the homeowner (purposive), or thwarting the
perpetrator (reverse-purposive). Crime prevention proponents often are unclear in their
description of these interventions. Ekblom concludes that “the important thing is for
practitioners and researchers to be self-aware of which discourse they are using.” Id. at 58.
34
Knepper, supra note 12, at 28.
35
That science is, or ought to be, “value free” is of course a separate issue that would
take us beyond this Article.
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leads to the conclusion that we should increase the effort needed to acquire
a gun. It seems obvious. But it is not.36 It is a leap from “increasing the
effort” to, for example, forbidding the sale of guns, requiring background
checks, requiring that guns be manufactured so that they do not work except
in the hands of the registered owner, or requiring substantial gun-use
training. We are not advocating these policies, but rather simply
highlighting how difficult it is to proceed from the initial scientific
observation to a social policy that is actually linked to the science.
The five guiding principles are each matched with five specific
examples or techniques in Column 2. Each technique advocates action and
is more specific than the general principle from which it is derived. Yet the
specific examples, from SCP’s perspective, remain general statements.
They are not specific enough for any particular situation. It is up to the
practitioner to apply these techniques to specific situations or problems.
They must be applied after an analysis of the situation that includes not only
the specific circumstances of the crime, but also the specific circumstances
of possible responders, especially the ownership and competency of those
responders.

36

Though as one reviewer pointed out, it could also be that these difficulties are simply
illustrative of the creativity that is needed to reduce crime!
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Table 1
Twenty-Five Techniques of Situational Crime Prevention (Abbreviated)
INCREASE THE EFFORT

INCREASE THE RISKS

REDUCE THE REWARDS

REDUCE PROVOCATIONS

REMOVE EXCUSES

Harden targets
Control access to facilities
Screen exits
Deflect offenders
Control tools/weapons
Extend guardianship
Assist natural surveillance
Reduce anonymity
Utilize place managers
Strengthen formal surveillance
Conceal targets
Remove targets
Identify property
Disrupt markets
Deny benefits
Reduce frustrations and stress
Avoid disputes
Reduce emotional arousal
Neutralize peer pressure
Discourage imitation
Set rules
Post instructions
Alert conscience
Assist compliance
Control drugs and alcohol

B. THE CHALLENGES OF APPLYING THE TWENTY-FIVE TECHNIQUES

If SCP demands that crimes be analyzed with as much specificity as
possible, how is it that these twenty-five techniques have been so easily
applied to a wide range of crimes,37 such as identity theft, cybercrime,
37

For discussions of SCP’s applications to these wide range of crimes, see SCHNEIDER,
supra note 7 (applying SCP strategies to protecting endangered species); Clarke, supra note
4 (discussing SCP strategies applied to prevent a variety of crimes such as prostitution,
check forgeries, repeat burglary and subway graffiti); REDUCING TERRORISM THROUGH
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION (Joshua D. Freilich & Graeme R. Newman eds., 25 Crime
Prevention Studies, 2009) (collecting articles by various authors analyzing a variety of
strategies that could be used to prevent different types of terrorism); Graeme R. Newman &
Joshua D. Freilich, Extending the Reach of Situational Crime Prevention, in THE REASONING

2015]

TRANSFORMING PIECEMEAL SOCIAL ENGINEERING

215

trafficking in endangered species, terrorism, and many more whose specific
situations have yet to be analyzed?
Further reflection on the generality of each of the twenty-five
techniques shows that they are examples of ways in which the guiding
principles can be operationalized, but they do not tell us what to do. For
instance, examining the well-known technique of “target harden” without
looking at the examples would not tell us how specifically to analyze a
target to determine how to harden it, or even how to figure out what is the
likely target in the first place.38 The usual answer is that one must analyze
the situation, and, once this is achieved, it will be obvious how to harden
the target.
But will it? Take the case of the 1982 Tylenol murders, in which seven
people died as a result of taking Tylenol laced with cyanide by unknown
persons.39 Was it obvious that the solution to hardening the target, in this
case bottles of Tylenol (not the potential murder victims who were the
actual targets—a significant insight in itself), lay not in changing the
specific situational arrangements of the bottles in the drug store? Was it
obvious that, similar to the British suicide drop, a response far removed
from the crime location was needed? Was it clear that the solution was to
change the bottles’ packaging, a decision that could be made only far away
in the Johnson & Johnson corporate office and implemented at the place of
manufacture?
After all, in this case, the specific drug store that sold the Tylenol was
located, and an analysis of the situation revealed that the tampering had
occurred not at the factory level but in the store.40 A typical piecemeal, local
SCP response might have called for installing cameras to keep the shelves
under surveillance, or for moving all merchandise behind the counter to
prevent its handling by customers. Instead, public outcry caused the
response that occurred far away from the situation. The Federal Trade
Commission entered the fray, and Johnson & Johnson introduced tamperevident packaging. Today, almost every company that markets consumable
products, from lipstick to iced tea, uses tamper-proof or tamper-evident
CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V. CLARKE, supra note 5, at 212 (discussing
the application of SCP to a variety of crimes such as suicide, auto theft, cybercrime, child
sex abuse migration and border control, organized crime, and tax evasion).
38
See RONALD V. CLARKE & GRAEME R. NEWMAN, OUTSMARTING THE TERRORISTS 87–
107 (2006) (discussing a central problem in using target hardening principles to protect
potential targets from terrorist attacks).
39
Ben Kesling, Tylenol Killings Remain Unsolved and Unforgotten After 30 Years: FBI
Hands off Inquiry to Chicago-Area Police; Victims' Kin Want Documents Unsealed, WALL
ST. J., (Oct. 11, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023034925
04579115573613137300, archived at http://perma.cc/95N2-3V24.
40
Id.
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packaging. It may have been the most successful crime prevention response
ever introduced. It prevented murders in specific locations from occurring
everywhere. Of course, we do not know how many murders were
prevented. And presumably, the widespread introduction of tamper-evident
and tamper-proof packaging resulted from corporate and government
policies.
Laycock’s approach41 argues that of course attention was directed to
Johnson & Johnson because they were the only ones capable of changing
the packaging.42 But the prior step of identifying the packaging as the
problem was required before the competency of the responder could be
determined. This identification of the problem resulted in its “ownership”
being transferred from the police to Johnson & Johnson. In other words, in
terms of ownership of the big problem, prevention shifted to the
multinational corporation. Meanwhile, the police were still stuck with the
smaller problem of finding the murderer or murderers, who were never
found. The Johnson & Johnson Tylenol example shows that, as one moves
further away from the situation in search of a response, the nature of the
problem changes, and the competency or ownership of the problem changes
with it.43 This is an important point. Distal and proximate causes of crime
and noncriminal problems are usually distinguished temporally.44 Thus,
suffering from prenatal trauma is more distal than being bullied at school.
In the Tylenol case, though, we are referring to distal in a multidimensional
way to include not only actions that occurred much earlier, but also macrolevel as opposed to micro-level or piecemeal, local planning. In other
words, our focus is on the proximity of the agent or agency with the
41

Gloria Laycock, Deciding What to Do, in HANDBOOK OF CRIME PREVENTION AND
COMMUNITY SAFETY, supra note 1, at 687, 690–92 (discussing local versus national level
crime prevention responses to crimes).
42
If a target for crime is a “hot product,” such as a smart phone, it may be preferable to
focus on the product itself and to work on the national level to make it more resistant. For
discussions on designing against crime (DAC), see Ekblom, supra note 22, at 53–56.
Similarly, in a few cases, environmental design could be used on the national level to
implement crime resistant building plans. Meanwhile, Lulham et al. note that SCP’s
techniques are useful for identifying problems, qualities of products, and potential
intervention points, but “were of little utility in the actual design process. We believe this
paradox is common. Many products that effectively design out crime are developed using
design processes that have little connection to established environmental criminology
frameworks.” Rohan Lulham et al., Designing a Counterterrorism Trash Bin, in DESIGN
AGAINST CRIME: CRIME PROOFING EVERYDAY PRODUCTS 131, 142 (Paul Ekblom ed., 27
Crime Prevention Studies, 2012).
43
For discussions about problem ownership, see Laycock, supra note 41, at 690–92. For
a discussion on how competency may not necessarily mean that the person or organization
owns the problem and vice versa (though this conundrum needs further elaboration), see
Laycock, supra note 41, at 691.
44
See Ekblom, supra note 29, at 204–05.
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competency to address the situation. Importantly, the temptation to apply
general responses to specific problems has lurked in the SCP literature for
decades.45 One of Clarke’s initial introductions of SCP over thirty years ago
noted that “a [general] ‘theory of crime’ would be almost as crude as a
‘general theory of disease’”46 and called for focusing on “separate” and
specific crimes. Interestingly though, a few pages later, Clarke noted that
in some cases . . . it may be possible to protect a whole class of property, as the
[British] Post Office did when they virtually eliminated theft from telephone kiosks by
replacing the vulnerable aluminum coin-boxes with much stronger steel ones . . . a
further example is provided by the recent law . . . which requires all motor-cyclists to
wear crash helmets.47

Since SCP’s main concern is crime prevention or reduction,48 its
conceptual underpinnings and its policy implications (the interventions to
reduce crime that flow from it) are intricately linked.49 Few SCP scholars
have focused on this linkage.50
C. DEVELOPING A GRADED FRAMEWORK FOR SELECTING LOCAL AND
MACRO-LEVEL SCP RESPONSES

The twenty-five techniques should thus be further elaborated to
acknowledge that responses that are distant from the situation be taken into
45

It would be wrong to assume that SCP has not acknowledged this difficulty. Clarke,
supra note 4, at 12–15. Clarke and Newman clearly note the relevance of macro-level factors
to specific problems with their elaborate diagrams of the opportunity structure for particular
crimes (drug crime and terrorism respectively), but the linkage of macro or background
factors to specific problems remains ephemeral. CLARKE & NEWMAN, supra note 38, at 7–9.
46
Clarke, supra note 10, at 137.
47
Id. at 141.
48
See id. at 139 (discussing SCP’s main focus on crime reduction).
49
A deeper discussion of this issue would take us beyond the purview of this paper. It
harks back to the old debate between pure and applied theory implying an element of
snobbery that somehow pure theory is superior to applied theory. Basically, what this means
in the history of criminology is that theorizing about the causes of crime is a superior
academic enterprise than theorizing about how to reduce it. It is worth noting that the
essential elements of SCP were established before the theory of rational choice was
incorporated into the theory, thus making it seem more respectable as a theory. Rational
choice is not a necessary condition for the situational analysis of crime reduction. In fact, the
aspect of “hard” situational crime requires simply the analysis of behavior, not cognition
(i.e., rational choice). See Newman & Freilich, supra note 37, at 213–17.
50
For example, Ekblom’s summary of his important work on SCP’s Designing Against
Crime (DAC) framework notes that it can “act at any of the ecological levels of
intervention,” and that a variety of observers have noted difficulty in moving “from problem
to cause to intervention.” Ekblom, supra note 29, at 206, 214. He does not, however, discuss
the possible inconsistency that might exist between a macro-level intervention and SCP’s
specificity requirement, nor does he go into great detail on when one level is preferred over
the other.
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account and the subsequent ownership/competency of the problem likewise
identified.51 It would take half a book to do this for each of the twenty-five
techniques. Instead, we outline what these crime prevention schemes might
look like just for the first technique, harden targets.

51
This approach would lead to a classification of crime prevention schemes that is
different from that of Bowers and Johnson. See Kate J. Bowers & Shane D. Johnson,
Implementation Failure and Success: Some Lessons from England, in PUTTING THEORY TO
WORK: IMPLEMENTING SITUATIONAL PREVENTION AND PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING, supra
note 8, at 163. This is because it remains tied to the general theory of rational choice (the five
categories in Column 1, Table 1) and stays within the twenty-five specific policies. On the
other hand, Bowers and Johnson include whether the prevention scheme is based on a
dispositional view of the offender, though they do include other aspects of SCP, such as the
agencies involved and the identification of the targets. Id.
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Table 2
Levels of Intervention for Hardening Targets
Situation

Theft of cars
in residential
street
Use of slugs
in New York
City parking
meters
Bank robbery

Robbery of
bus drivers

Typical situationally bound
response

Redefinition of
problem52

Macro response
(distant from
situation)

x Improve street lighting
x Owners lock cars
x Owners move cars into
garage
x Do not use parking meters
x Install surveillance
cameras

Design of cars
makes them too
easy to steal

Manufacturers
redesign cars, install
immobilizers

Parking meters
are too easy to
foil

Install slug rejecter
devices in meters;
build more parking
garages

x Install shields for tellers
x Guards at bank entrance
x Install alarms, surveillance
cameras
x Install shields for drivers

Bank tellers are
too obvious and
inviting a target
Money is the
target, so
remove it
Plastic cards
are too easy to
counterfeit

Install ATMs and do
away with tellers
completely; shift to
online banking.
Introduce smart
cards bought
elsewhere
Make cards tamper
proof;require PIN at
point of sale.

Credit card
fraud

x Train clerks to check
signature and
identification

Robbery at
ATMs

x Install better lighting
x Surveil place
x Relocate ATM

Money is the
problem

Online commerce
and banking

Theft from
pay phones

x Make coin boxes
impregnable
x Natural surveillance

Money is the
problem

Phone cards bought
elsewhere,
ownership of
problem moved to
corporate from
government.

Street corner
drug dealing

x Formal surveillance
x Natural surveillance
x Police stings

Street corner is
the problem

Redesign streets,
traffic movement

52

Ekblom similarly notes that designers sometimes reframe how the product is viewed.
Ekblom, supra note 29, at 216.
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Illegal
immigration

x Build a fence

Cheap labor is
the problem

Shoplifting

x Change display of goods
x Surveillance

Products are
easy to steal

Soliciting
prostitution
(“carding”)

x Remove notices daily from
phone booth

Phone numbers,
not the notices,
are the problem

[Vol. 105

Guest worker
program;
international
agreements
Redesign products;
put small products
in large packages
Telephone company
blocks specific
phone numbers

Table 2 illustrates that the response that is distant from the situation
applies not only to its specific situation (theft of cars in residential streets)
but to the theft of cars in other situations as well. Thus, if one can locate the
macro level of intervention for a problem, why not go straight to the “root
cause” of the security flaw? It is also apparent that there are many
situationally-bound responses that require intervention from a distant
source. Building a fence along a national border, for example, while the
need may be situationally determined, may require massive input from
national governments. Making coin boxes impregnable may require that the
original manufacturers agree to redesign or retrofit the product.
The responses therefore may be classified roughly into three
categories: situationally-bound local approaches, mixed, and macro, as
outlined in Table 3.53

53

See generally ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (Paul J. Brantingham & Patricia L.
Brantingham eds., 1981) (discussing the various levels at which SCP interventions could be
directed).
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Table 3
Responses Classified According to Distance from the Situation
Situationally bound

Mixed

Macro

ATM lighting

National border control,
fence design

Product design

Risk assessment of
facilities
Product layout in stores
Video surveillance in
stores
Lock car and house and
hide PIN
Shred bills
Money belt
Credit card
authentication at point of
sale
Hide social security
number

Video surveillance of
roads, public (common)
space
Local ordinances (risky
facilities, etc.)
Credit card
authentication (retailers
associations)
Border control (fence
patrols, etc.)
Protect personal
information (doctors’
offices, retail stores)

Urban/rural
design/planning
Packaging-tamper proof
and tamper evident
Legislation
Regulation
Law suits
Information systems
design (credit card
security design,
authentication—banks,
card issuers, etc.),
software, internet
International agreements,
interstate agreements
National border control –
smart passports
Protect personal
information (banks,
governments)

As the listings in Table 3 indicate, some problems, perhaps even most
problems, require a multilevel approach to responding. Take the example of
credit card fraud. At the macro level, even the best-designed tamper-proof
credit or smart cards will not prevent fraud if the middle organizations, such
as retailers, do not install equipment necessary to eliminate human error at
the point of sale.54 Consider also the introduction of steering column locks
to prevent car theft. The first form of steering column locks was the steel
bar, which users locked onto the steering wheel. But the effectiveness of
these tools in preventing car theft obviously depends, at the situationally54

Graeme R. Newman, Check and Card Fraud: Guide No. 21, CENTER FOR PROBLEMORIENTED POLICING 3 available at http://www.popcenter.org/problems/credit_card_fraud/
print/, archived at http://perma.cc/93F5-XAP5.
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bound local level, on an individual user buying and installing the lock.
Eventually, manufacturers began installing steering column locks in cars
which were effective for some time in preventing theft.55 However, thieves
figured out ways around the locks, so new technologies were needed. The
locks have now been replaced with immobilizers and other electronic
security systems installed by manufacturers. While these technologies have
been found to be very effective,56 they do not prevent the theft of a car in
which the owner has left the keys.
Given this complexity in analyzing specific problems and, some might
even say, the unanticipated consequences that may result from responding
to specific local problems, how are we able to develop social policies that
advocate action by individuals and organizations to prevent specific crimes?
Is it logical for SCP advocates to make policy statements directed to
individuals or organizations, such as, “do not publish social security
numbers,” to prevent identity theft? Does this policy statement differ from
the policy statement made by the medical profession that “smoking is
damaging to your health,” and the subsequent requirement that this
statement be placed on the packaging of cigarettes?
The most serious barrier to converting SCP techniques into policy
remains the gap between problem identification and problem response. As
we have noted, SCP insists on the minute analysis of the problem to be
solved, making the employment of intervention techniques highly specific
to the situation’s time, place, and type of opportunity present. As Tilley
explains, “the story of SCP is one of repeated small achievements.” 57
Furthermore, some SCP proponents like Popper argue that grand schemes
and policies are doomed to failure because they are too abstract and
unrealistic. Indeed, Knepper claims SCP is only applicable to problems that
are “suitable for piecemeal experiments to alleviate them,”58 and Eck and
Madensen note that SCP’s interventions are “at the meso-level . . . below
large-scale social institutions.”59 In sum, many SCP proponents claim that
grand initiatives are outside its purview. Yet it is clear from Table 3 that
55
Barry Webb, Steering Column Locks and Motor Vehicle Theft: Evaluations from
Three Countries, in 2 CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 71, 71–72 (Ronald V. Clarke ed., 1994).
56
See Rick Brown, The Effectiveness of Electronic Immobilization: Changing Patterns
of Temporary and Permanent Vehicle Theft, in UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING CAR
THEFT 101 (Michael G. Maxfield & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 17 Crime Prevention Studies,
2004).
57
Tilley, supra note 11, at 51.
58
Knepper, supra note 12, at 35.
59
John E. Eck & Tamara D. Madensen, Situational Crime Prevention Makes ProblemOriented Policing Work: The Importance of Interdependent Theories for Effective Policing,
in THE REASONING CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V. CLARKE, supra note 5,
at 80, 83.
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many, if not all, situationally-bound local problems cannot be effectively or
permanently solved without interventions at the meso or macro levels.
Thus, how can SCP more consistently develop general social policy
applicable to many situations—perhaps all situations—for a class of crimes,
or even targeting a range of products and services, when it appears to view
general responses as secondary?
As we have noted throughout this Article, SCP has mostly eschewed
ideal and abstract policies. However, policies that are evidence-driven
surely should not be rejected out of hand by SCP, so long as their
evidentiary link to the specific problem can be demonstrated. Criminal and
other types of law develop and implement such policies. There are
professionals—judges, lawyers, administrators and organizations like
courts—whose role it is to apply these general statements of law to specific,
even unique, cases. Indeed, proponents of SCP have researched the effects
of particular legislation on specific crimes.60
III. DISCUSSION
SCP’s twenty-five techniques are more accurately classified as
mechanisms for implementing a set of guiding principles that advocate a
range of possible responses to potentially specific situations. However,
depending on how the responder closest to the situation analyzes, or
redefines, the specific problem, the response may be transferred to the
person or organization most competent to respond to the problem. Again
though, this outcome will depend on what kind of problem it is. Clearly, the
ownership of the problem could be transferred in both directions, from the
macro- to the local-level, and from the local- to the macro-level at various
times. An example of the former relates to the protection of potential
terrorist targets. Clarke and Newman argue that the “responsibility for
protecting targets must ‘cascade’ down from the highest level of
government to progressively lower levels (and to corporations and
businesses).”61 These “top-down” government initiatives to protect targets
involve the sticky issue of the government’s role in implementing policies.
At the same time, these government initiatives must acknowledge that
many, if not all, of the situations described above are the domain of private
businesses, local, national and multinational. Suffice it to say that, in many
situations, it may be difficult for government to obtain businesses’ (and
individuals’) consent to do what they want them to do to solve a particular
60
See generally Johannes Knutsson & Eckart Kuhlhorn, Macro-measures Against
Crime: The Example of Check Forgeries, in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION: SUCCESSFUL
CASE STUDIES, supra note 4, at 113 (discussing legislation that requires banks to verify
identification before cashing a check).
61
Clarke & Newman, supra note 38, at 218.
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problem. The enormous increase in government regulation in the past few
decades62 attests to the acknowledgment that governments are increasingly
assuming the ownership of problems (e.g. global warming). And
governments at the same time must rely on businesses and individuals to
implement their policies. However, in the face of the doubtful effectiveness
of government regulation63 in changing behavior (with some notable
exceptions, such as car seat belt use) the question remains whether it makes
practical sense to define the ownership of problems away from the
situations in which they occur.
The process also works in the other direction. For example, the first
use of fences as a situational response to thwart suicide bombers and other
terrorist infiltrators in both Israel and the West Bank was not implemented
on the national level.64 Initially, local police and community leaders, who
were trying to stop terrorists from making incursions into their
communities, constructed these fences in a piecemeal fashion. It was only at
a much later date that the use of physical barriers became national policy.
Thus, if analyses of specific problems identify a consistently successful
policy implemented in various locales, that policy could be considered for a
supersized intervention.65 Similarly, heeding Tilley’s admonitions discussed
above, perhaps national-level interventions should only be undertaken after
analyses of local problems identify a consistently successful policy
implemented piecemeal in various locales. This approach would help insure
that if a policy failed to reduce crime or had unintended results, these
negative consequences would only affect the specific locales that
implemented the strategy.

62

For a discussion in favor of using government regulations to reduce crime, see
generally John E. Eck & Emily B. Eck, Crime Place and Pollution: Expanding Crime
Reduction Options Through a Regulatory Approach, 11 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 281
(2012). The authors note that because crime is concentrated spatially and at specific
locations, government regulatory options could be used to compel owners and others to take
the necessary steps to reduce crime at their establishments and locations.
63
Graeme R. Newman, A Market Approach to Crime Prevention, in DESIGN AGAINST
CRIME: CRIME PROOFING EVERYDAY PRODUCTS, supra note 42, at 87, 87–91.
64 Simon Perry et al., Using Physical Barriers to Prevent Terrorist Attacks: An
Evaluation and Test of Crime Displacement Theory (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with authors).
65
See Assaf Moghadam, How Al Qaeda Innovates, 22 SECURITY STUD. 466, 472–74
(2013) (including a discussion on “bottom up” terrorist innovation that highlights the key
roles terrorist “middle managers” and other subordinates play in devising innovative ideas
and strategies).
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A. PROBLEM OWNERSHIP

In some cases, ownership may be “shared” by several potential
responders.66 These responders usually include governmental agencies
outside the legal system and private sector entities. Whether ownership is
shared depends upon “the ways of thinking and working of whichever
groups of applied social scientists or practitioners are [involved].”67
However, the actual technique or action that should be implemented to
respond to the problem remains a challenge to those given the task to solve.
Presumably, finding a solution requires heavy input by designers,
engineers, technicians, and others with technical and detailed knowledge of
the problem at both the macro and micro levels. Again, SCP’s focus on
agencies, organizations, and individuals beyond the criminal justice system
to reduce crime distinguishes it from other criminological frameworks.
At the macro level, corporate individuals may have to face such
questions as:
What are the implications of repackaging an entire line of products to prevent theft?
How can we obtain cooperation from retailers to install new devices for authenticating
credit card ownership?
How can we design or redesign a product, its marketing, or its packaging to make it
less attractive to steal but still attractive to buy?
How can we convert theft-reduction techniques into profit centers, for example,
marketing of virus protection software, converting retail store identification cards into
special membership cards offering extra privileges.

And at the local level:
To what extent is this problem solvable at the micro level?
Is this problem mostly situationally determined (in that local influences are interacting
with the proximal causes) or is it mostly determined by factors distant from it?
How can, or should, the problem be redefined and its ownership shifted to those
distant from the situation?
What policies are needed to make such shifts in ownership possible?
Drawing from the CLAIMED68 framework, how can individuals or organizations—
whether within or distant from the situation—that are identified as competent to

66
See Scott, supra note 29, at 392–405 (discussing how the police in responding to crime
problems must at times cooperate with others, such as private citizens, other government
agencies, or nongovernmental organizations—and share in the responsibility—to effectively
reduce or eliminate the problem).
67
Cornish & Smith, supra note 5, at 32.
68
CLAIMED stands for: Clarify the task/role to be undertaken; Locate the appropriate
agencies and individuals most suited for the requirement; Alert these agencies or individuals;
Inform them; Motivate them; Empower them; Direct them. See Paul Ekblom, CRIME
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address the problem, or parts of it, be mobilized to undertake particular prevention
tasks and roles?

Finally, specialists must also consider whether resistance from retailers
or any other key constituent will be greater on either of the levels. And for
crime prevention specialists, what are the overall advantages of a particular
macro intervention that may have been derived from analysis of a specific
local problem but may apply to many diverse situations? Macro
interventions appear to be an effective way to prevent many crimes with
one significant intervention. But is there any way to measure the preventive
effect of such macro interventions, since the measure of their success is the
number of crimes that did not happen? This challenge must be overcome if
we want those distant from the specific situations of crime to acknowledge
their responsibility for incorporating crime prevention techniques into their
products, services, and marketing. Without a general solution to this
measurement problem, the way forward to regulate the negative
externalities of crime produced by corporations and other large
organizations is severely hampered and will only ever be achieved on a
piecemeal basis.69
B. THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE

What is the role for government? Do SCP attempts to implement
national level prevention efforts inevitably lead to social engineering (long
feared by SCP proponents)70 or excessive social control (also long feared by
SCP critics)?71 On one hand, as noted, efforts to change people have mostly
been shunned by SCP as too grand. Unlike the rest of criminology, which is
offender-focused, SCP focuses on events, targets, and opportunities.
Similarly, interventions aimed at redesigning products, like the changes to
the British gas supply and Tylenol’s packaging, raise fewer social
engineering worries.72 These are not utopian schemes designed to remake
people: they are product-focused prevention efforts. Unlike grand initiatives
to eliminate poverty, inequality, or crime, for that matter, SCP’s national
PREVENTION, SECURITY AND COMMUNITY SAFETY USING THE 5IS FRAMEWORK 233–38
(2011).
69
For in-depth overviews of this measurement plan, see Clarke & Newman, supra note
7, at 7–83; Newman, supra note 63.
70
See generally Knepper, supra note 12, for a discussion of this issue.
71
See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 170–71 (2001).
72
While raising fewer concerns, attention still must be paid to legal and ethical issues.
Ekblom reminds us that designers “must also consider whether their design violates privacy
or unacceptably constrains freedom in some way—for example, a mobile phone which
reports on someone’s movements, whether tracking him or her for his or her own good or for
other people’s, without his or her awareness or free consent.” Ekblom, supra note 29, at 216.
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prevention efforts are not focused on abstract causes. SCP’s Tylenol
solution, for instance, addressed general but concrete solutions: tamperproof packaging of all consumer products, not the causes of random
murder.73 In other words, product redesign is accomplished by companies or
organizations that have a vested interest in the product’s success and
safety.74
On the other hand, a more complex issue is not the redesign of
products, but the national-level regulation of the use, or non-use, of
products, goods, and substances by people. Some products, goods, or
substances have been linked to many crimes (either as physical tools or as
chemical disinhibitors) and are called crime facilitators. The most common
examples are alcohol, drugs, and firearms. Laycock explains that these
products or substances “facilitate or are variously involved in crimes
locally. The rules governing these facilitators, and the ease with which they
can be accessed, are [and should be] controlled by central government.”75
Indeed, Van Dijk, in his address accepting the prestigious Stockholm
Award, extolled the virtues of SCP and called for regulating access to crime
facilitators. Van Dijk argued that “[t]he restriction of access to alcohol for
young people would take a serious bite out of violent crime . . . .
And . . . governments . . . should make every effort to reduce gun ownership
among their population.”76
While nationally restricting access to crime facilitators could reduce
crime, it also raises the danger of a slippery slope toward social
engineering. In addition to endorsing strict gun control laws,77 former New
York City Mayor Bloomberg also favors regulating the intake of sugar
through soft drinks and other similar foods and drinks.78 These sorts of
initiatives affect everyone, and companies cannot simply implement them,
unlike product redesign. With American society’s focus on individual
73
Again, such actions might raise social control issues, if surveillance was also involved.
But, these are not new criticisms. We elaborate on this point below in the Conclusion.
74
Often, this is accomplished through (national or local) governments pressuring these
companies. See Newman, supra notes 54 and 63. However, as one reviewer of this article
noted in the peer review, local campaigners (as with road safety) could also attempt such
influence if they were not so focused on offender-oriented interventions.
75
Laycock, supra note 41, at 694.
76
Jan Van Dijk, Closing the Doors: Stockholm Prizewinners Lecture 34 (2012),
available at https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1519203/120665_afsch_rede_van_Dijk_final.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/6NV5-CT42.
77
Mayor Bloomberg Teams Up with Boston Mayor for Gun Control Super Bowl Ad,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/03/
mayor-bloomberg-teams-up-menino-super-bowl-gun-control_n_1253093.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/4Y3M-VF8Q.
78
See Michael M. Grynbaum, Mayor Planning a Ban on Big Sizes of Sugary Drinks,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2012, at A1.
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rights, it seems that implementing initiatives that require individuals to act
in a certain way or that restrict them from acting in another way will be
more controversial and difficult to achieve.79 Severely regulating or
restricting access to products like alcohol, drugs, firearms, or, for that
matter, sugar, could also paradoxically create crime if black markets
emerge. After all, SCP has long noted that “opportunity makes the thief.”80
The history of prohibition, and some could argue, the long war on drugs,
provide some support for this notion. Further, SCP has consistently
supported a “market” approach (a general, not specific, response) to achieve
reductions in drug crimes and trafficking in stolen goods and in endangered
species.81
In sum, SCP proponents may first want to focus on product redesign,
like guns that will fire only when held by registered owners, before
considering regulation of crime facilitators. Importantly, though, any
regulation that does occur would by definition be more limited and raise
fewer concerns if implemented locally and piecemeal as opposed to through
national policies.
It remains to be seen just how far these kinds of controls will reach,
given the resourcefulness of individuals and businesses in working their
ways around such regulations. As Ekblom82 and others have shown,
criminals who are dedicated to getting what they want are very resourceful
at adapting their techniques in the face of preventive responses such as
target hardening. The history of car theft, for example, clearly shows that
each time new ways of thwarting car theft are introduced, thieves find a
way around them.83
79

A related observation is that many grand macro-level interventions have occurred in
Europe, and not in the United States. This raises the interesting issue of the established
divide that exists between the United States and Europe in embracing the role of SCP in
reducing crime. It could be that the greater enthusiasm for SCP in Europe partially explains
why grand macro-level interventions are more likely to occur there. Conversely, the arguably
greater emphasis on individual liberty and personal autonomy (on both the libertarian right
and the civil liberty left) in the United States may explain why grand interventions are less
likely and the piecemeal approach is more favored there.
80
See generally Marcus Felson & Ronald V. Clarke, Opportunity Makes the Thief:
Practical Theory for Crime Prevention, in POLICE RESEARCH SERIES 1 (Police Research
Series No. 98, 1998) (noting the important role opportunity plays in crime causation).
81
For discussions of SCP and the market approach, see Newman, supra note 63, at 87–
105; Andrew M. Lemieux & Ronald V. Clarke, The International Ban on Ivory Sales and Its
Effects on Elephant Poaching in Africa, 49 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 451 (2009).
82
See Paul Ekblom, Making Offenders Richer, in IMAGINATION FOR CRIME PREVENTION:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KEN PEASE 41 (Graham Farrell, et al. eds., 21 Crime Prevention
Studies, 2007); Paul Ekblom & Nick Tilley, Going Equipped: Criminology, Situational
Crime Prevention and the Resourceful Offender, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 376 (2000).
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See Michael G. Maxfield, Introduction to UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING CAR
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We have come a long way since Clarke first introduced SCP.84 All
things considered, the theory has advanced rapidly. Other approaches to
crime prevention have yet to even acknowledge that new policies are
needed to prevent crime and that the ownership of many crime problems
lies way beyond police. Few theories in criminology highlight crime
prevention or even reduction as their prime concern. Conversely, SCP is a
policy-based approach of prevention and requires rather little tinkering to
apply its policies to many situations and to many levels of government and
private organizations. Its guiding principles and their techniques apply
easily and broadly to many diverse kinds of crimes. Indeed, its policies will
become even more widely applied because SCP is so well-adapted to how
crimes (methods, techniques, targets, etc.) change along with historical,
cultural, and technological conditions.
Yet when we examine the macro level of SCP as we have
demonstrated in this Article, it is clear that many specific crimes cannot be
successfully prevented or reduced without the cooperation of corporations,
businesses, and other organizations in addition to the police. SCP therefore
must continue to engage the same problem of social control, the central
question addressed by sociologists since the creation of their discipline:
How do you get people and organizations to do what you want?85
IV. CRIMINOLOGY, SCIENCE, AND POLICY
Our final comments relate to a larger issue that has lurked in the
background of this Article: the question of the relationship between science
and policy. It is obvious that any attempt in SCP to move from scientific
observation (e.g., evidence that availability of guns is a cause of gun
violence) to a policy (e.g., criminalizing the ownership, use, or manufacture
of guns) entails a large leap that leaves science behind and enters the murky
fields of values and politics. In this respect, criminology has lagged behind
other fields of science such as environmental pollution and climate change
whose findings have motivated their advocates to convert their science into
public policy, often with political and controversial results. For example, if
THEFT, supra note 56.
84
For a general overview of the SCP approach, see Clarke, supra note 10; Mayhew et
al., supra note 10.
85
SCP has addressed this issue in a number of ways, such as the CLAIMED framework
discussed above. In addition, Kennedy’s innovative work on gun crime and open drug
markets highlights the importance of leverage in influencing people’s behaviors. See David
M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of
Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449 (1997). This strategy relies upon cooperation between
the police and community organizations and uses specific deterrence to “deter” particular
chronic offenders by informing them that continued misbehavior will result in targeted
arrest, prosecution, and enhanced sentences.
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we take the public health problem of obesity and the presumption that it is
the intake of too much sugar that is the cause, we may follow SCP’s first
guiding principle and increase the effort needed to consume sugar. The final
social policy, expressed in regulations as in New York City, may be to
forbid the sale of sixteen-ounce containers of soda.
One can see, however, that it is a leap from the scientific observation
that individuals become obese because of the intake of too much sugar, to
the final policy that forbids the sale of large containers of soda. This
response was massive and general, but it was directed at a highly specific
target. That this intervention will reduce the sugar intake and presumably
solve the public health problems of diabetes and obesity of New Yorkers
seems to anticipate the science rather than follow it. The scientific thing to
do—evidence-driven public policy—would be to first assess if the proposed
intervention is plausible a priori in terms of tested theory, and, if so, assess
its effectiveness.86 One possibility would be to run trials to determine
whether legislating against the sale of sixteen-ounce sodas actually does
reduce sugar intake among New Yorkers. To put it another way, it is one
thing to observe that sugar intake is bad for one’s health; it is another thing
to legislate the reduction of sugar intake even though, from the SCP
perspective, making sugar less accessible (increasing the effort needed to
obtain sugar) fits nicely into SCP’s guiding principles of the Twenty-Five
Techniques. SCP has always acknowledged that just because a policy could
be implemented does not mean it should be employed. Those charged with
designing the interventions are encouraged to weigh individual privacy and
other rights with public safety and community concerns to devise the type
of prevention policy society is most comfortable with.87
In fact, policy statements directed against specific crimes with the goal
of preventing them everywhere88 are commonly met with cries of
overbearing control.89 These policy statements, after all, seek to prevent
crimes before they happen (as in preventing cancer).90 But preventing
86

See generally Mike Maxfield, Evaluation for Everyday Life, in THE REASONING
CRIMINOLOGIST: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF RONALD V. CLARKE, supra note 5, at 119 (discussing
evaluation research).
87
See Marcus Felson & Ronald V. Clarke, The Ethics of Situational Crime Prevention,
in SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 197, 199, 215–16 (Graeme R. Newman, Ronald V.
Clarke & Shlomo G. Shoham eds., 1997).
88
This appears to reflect a contradiction, since if the crime is specific it could not occur
everywhere. We return to this difficulty later.
89
See GARLAND, supra note 71, at 170–71.
90
We recognize, as was pointed out to us, that policy statements are not limited to
regulation. Indeed, they often take the form of advice such as publicity campaigns designed
to encourage or discourage behavior such as the “Don’t drink and drive” and “Lock it or lose
it” campaigns. See Scott, supra note 29, at 399–400.
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cancer appears to be a more popular justification for issuing blanket policies
advocating social control, perhaps because particular corporations with
deep pockets have been successfully sued for causing cancer. Social critics
like Garland have imagined the onset of the “culture of control” and blamed
SCP for it,91 yet they withhold criticism of the government entities and
regulations that now control the tobacco industry.92
A more complicated criminology example is the recent interest among
some criminologists in “green criminology,” especially crimes against the
environment. These criminologists have been joined by climatologists and
other natural sciences in claiming that all of this pollution has caused
climate change and that immediate action must be taken to address this
problem. In the realm of criminology, Newman has observed that “radical
criminologists” have taken just one position on this problem: they define
environmental pollution as a crime and advocate that it be punished in the
traditional manner (i.e., fines, prison, shaming, etc.).93 This approach is,
from the SCP point of view, traditional rather than radical, since it directs
its concern against the offenders rather than the situational environments.
Newman asks the rhetorical question, what if we were to treat carbon
production as a market problem rather than a crime problem?94 Which
would be the most effective in reducing carbon? Even if we had such
research, we would only be halfway there in terms of policy. The next step
in formulating policy requires an assessment of costs, benefits, and values
mixed in with the persuasiveness of the scientific findings. In the field of
climate change, this process can take on quite remarkable contortions. The
advocates who are scientists use the authority of science to claim that their
problem trumps all other problems (e.g., world hunger, economic
development). And the scientists who disagree are disparaged as skeptics,
even though healthy skepticism is a hallowed principle of the scientific
method.
We hasten to add that we do not take sides on this issue. We simply
use the climate change controversy to illustrate what may lie ahead for
criminology as it moves increasingly into the realm of crime prevention.
SCP is at the forefront of this frontier and has much to offer mainstream
criminology. It may be argued that the controversies and issues of value are
good reason for mainstream criminology to stay away from policy and
91

See GARLAND, supra note 71, at 103–38, 170–71.
There are many ways in which modern society has become one of control, but this has
little to do with SCP’s advocacy of various interventions. Rather, one might argue that
technology and historical conditions have been kind to SCP.
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Newman, supra note 63, at 89.
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Newman, supra note 63. For the sake of this example, we assume that the science
pronouncing carbon as a threat to life on earth is valid.
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defend the (presumed) neutrality of scientific criminology. However,
modern technologies like social media, communications, and information
technologies, bring with them new forms of crime along with the
technologies of control designed to prevent them. Such technologies
include surveillance and geospatial analysis linked into immense databases
of personal information. Furthermore, the criminalization of terrorism will
force criminologists to acknowledge the political nature of crime and both
the necessity and difficulties in constructing policies to prevent it.95 These
changes in the nature of crime as well as the possibilities to prevent it are
already upon us. Like it or not, mainstream criminology will be dragged
into the policy challenges of the preventive crime control in the near future.
This paper has shown that SCP has already made great strides in this
direction, but that the way forward, especially in terms of evidence-based
crime prevention, faces many difficult challenges with respect to preserving
and carefully defining the important link between science and policy.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have shown that Situational Crime Prevention, an
action-oriented approach in criminology, could be harnessed to develop
policies at the macro and local levels of society in the service of crime
reduction. The graded approach that we have outlined for linking the macro
and local levels of analysis in terms of problem definition and response
provides a general framework for moving forward. Our goal in this Article
was to outline a new criminology of social control. We view its publication
in this particular journal, which deals in parallel fashion with the topics of
criminal law and criminology, as highly appropriate and significant. We
have shown that Situational Crime Prevention holds the key to spanning the
gap between these two fields. This gap is rapidly being filled by an
immense array of regulatory activity by governments at various levels and
by innovative efforts on the part of corporations to circumvent, exploit, and
comply with regulations aimed at the reduction of crime and other social
problems. While the traditional response to crime is punishment
administered by means of the criminal law and the justice system, SCP
demonstrates that there are many alternatives to—including variations of—
punishment in solving crime problems.
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For a discussion about the politics surrounding terrorism prevention policies and
migration legislation, see CLARKE & NEWMAN, supra note 38, at 139–55.

